China review 2024-2. The geopolitical puzzle of the South China Sea. Does China’s ambitions are facing regional resistance?

China, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia have all made territorial claims in the South China Sea. The most ambitious among these is China, whose territorial claims are epitomised by the “11-dash line”, which first appeared in the mid-20th century (later revised to the well-known “9-dash line” after China established friendly relations with North Vietnam and “renounced” its claims in the Gulf of Tonkin[2]). It is worth noting that China’s territorial claims are not directly linked to the People’s Republic of China as they predate the Chinese Communist Party’s rise to power. Beijing became markedly more active in the 1970s, gradually expanding the reach of its territorial claims. To justify its claim to more than 85% of the region, China often employs historical sources, maps, and imperial-era documents that, Beijing asserts, demonstrate centuries-old Chinese activities in the area, such as fishing, exploration, and maritime navigation. However, this type of argument is not convincing, with other countries categorically rejecting China’s historically charged narrative. For instance, the Philippines’ Supreme Court Associate Justice Antonio Carpio shared his research investigating maps of Imperial China that date back as far as the year 900, which show China’s southernmost territory to be limited to the island of Hainan, located 23 kilometres off the Chinese coast.

China’s recently introduced “10-Dash Line”. Source: Sankei Shimbun/Japan Forward.

From China’s perspective, this region is the “lifeline” of the country’s economic and energy security. The region – or, more precisely, dominance over it – is of paramount importance for China’s security and its ability to project power beyond the first island chain. As a result, Beijing’s paranoia about its economic vulnerability is driving it to scramble for alternatives, one of which is yet another revival of the 400-year-old idea of developing Thailand’s Kra Canal, which would require an investment of approximately 30 billion euros. This 90-kilometre-long land bridge would potentially have tangible benefits for Thailand’s economy. Still, more importantly, it would be vital for China, particularly if Chinese trade flows were to be blocked in the Strait of Malacca. This article will explore two notable examples of how states in the region are responding to China’s increasingly aggressive behaviour, namely the reactions and responses of Vietnam and the Philippines to escalating tensions in the South China Sea.

The Philippines: Firm Stance and Westward Turn

In recent years, the Philippines has emerged as one of the most vocal and active critics of China’s actions in the South China Sea, signalling a notable shift in its policy towards China. The foreign policy approach initiated by Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who took office in June 2022, is almost diametrically opposite to that of his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte. Duterte prioritised relations with China, while Marcos has revitalised and strengthened ties with the country’s traditional security partners, such as the US and Japan, and forged closer relations with Western countries like Sweden and France.

China, of course, finds this unacceptable: since President Marcos took office in 2022, confrontations between the two countries have escalated at both Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal. Beijing is keeping a close eye on this negative shift in bilateral relations. In December 2023, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made an accusation that the Philippines has “changed its policy stance so far, reneged on the promises it has made, [and] constantly provoked troubles at sea”. Wang also issued a warning that if the Philippines misjudges the situation, insists on continuing its course or even colludes with “ill-intentioned external forces” to stir up further trouble or chaos, China will certainly defend its rights by lawful means and respond resolutely.

The South China Sea conflict was one of the key issues under the spotlight in this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue. President Marcos’s remarks perfectly illustrated how dangerous the situation in the region is and where the Philippines draws its new red lines: “[…] what would happen if there was an incident that ended up killing a Filipino serviceman, be it from the Coast Guard, the military, or the Navy […] that would certainly increase the level of response […]. If a Filipino citizen is killed by a wilful act, that is I think very, very close to what we define as an act of war and therefore we will respond accordingly.” For his part, Chinese Defence Minister Dong Ju proclaimed that despite “overall stability” in the region, a certain country, with support from external forces, continues to violate bilateral agreements and break its promises, and “has made premeditated provocations and created false scenarios to mislead the public”. Reacting to criticism his country faced over its aggressive actions in the region, he claimed that “China has exercised great restraint in the face of such infringements and provocations”.

Since August 2023, at least ten confrontations have occurred between China and the Philippines. All of them revolve around the intentionally grounded Filipino warship Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal (or Ayungin Shoal in the Philippines) in 1999, which has since served as a permanently manned outpost defending the Philippines’ territorial claims. According to various estimates, this warship relic was expected to have fallen apart by 2015. However, due to periodic supply missions, which are vital to the warship’s repair and troop supply, it did not happen, and it is during these operations that dangerous confrontations with China tend to occur. Beijing’s growing ambition to prevent the maintenance of this Philippine outpost is crystal clear: in 2022, an average of 2.5 Philippine vessels were involved in resupply missions, compared with 4.4 vessels on the Chinese side. In 2023, the number of Chinese vessels increased to an average of 13.9, while Filipino vessels rose only slightly to 3.

One of the most recent and most dangerous confrontations during a resupply mission occurred on 17 June. The Armed Forces of the Philippines described the incident by issuing the following statement: “The China Coast Guard’s coercive, aggressive, and barbaric actions during the humanitarian rotation and resupply mission […] resulted in severe damage to AFP vessels, including their communication and navigation equipment. CCG personnel were also caught on camera brandishing an assortment of bladed and pointed weapons threatening to injure AFP troops.” Later, commenting on the situation, the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Chief Gen. Romeo Brawner Jr. likened the conduct of the China Coast Guard to that of pirates: “Only pirates do this. Only pirates board, steal, and destroy ships, equipment, and belongings,” Brawner said. Although there were no casualties, one sailor was reportedly severely wounded. In response, China placed the blame on the Philippines, stating that Manilla “has been sending construction materials, and even weapons and ammunition, to the illegally grounded military vessel in order to repair and reinforce it on a large scale so that it can permanently occupy [contested territories].”

Vietnam: The Hidden Fractures Behind Red Brotherhood

Vietnam’s case is interesting and deserves more attention than it gets. At the political level, Vietnam’s so-called “Bamboo Diplomacy” in the balancing act between Beijing and Washington (and, to a certain extent, Russia) has been very consistent. Still, Hanoi’s actions in the South China Sea deserve exclusive attention, particularly in the context of the confrontation and rivalry with China.

Over the past decade, the international media has portrayed the “socialist” friendship between China and Vietnam in a very positive light, highlighting frequent visits by leaders, their friendly statements, and their strong emphasis on bilateral development across multiple areas. The exceptional prioritisation of relations with China over those with other countries is evident in the specific intricacies of Vietnam’s political system, such as by looking at the official “inviters” of foreign leaders. The visit of the King and Queen of the Netherlands at the end of March was in response to an invitation from the President of Vietnam (the second highest-ranking official in the country). In contrast, the recent visit of President Vladimir Putin of Russia was at the invitation of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam. Meanwhile, the December 2023 visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping took place at the invitation of both the President of Vietnam and the General Secretary of the Communist Party – a sign of top priority for Hanoi. However, to fully understand the seemingly strong comradeship between the two countries, it is crucial to take into account its historical context: in 1979, a border war erupted between China and Vietnam, and although it did not escalate significantly, sporadic clashes continued until 1991 when relations were normalised. During this period, one of the deadliest confrontations in the South China Sea took place in 1988, when the two countries clashed over disputed territories in the Spratly archipelago, leading to the sinking of three Vietnamese ships and the deaths of 72 Vietnamese.

The situation in the contested territories underscores the characterisation of Vietnam’s complex political relations with China as “transactional”. Unlike the Philippines, Vietnam has maintained a steadfast and assertive stance towards the East Sea for decades. Given the developments in recent decades, Hanoi’s strategy seems to be working. The 2014 Oil Rig Standoff in the Gulf of Tonkin, considered one of the most serious since the bloody confrontation of 1988, was largely resolved in favour of Hanoi due to its firm stance, with China’s planned redeployment of the oil platform completely abandoned ahead of schedule. This event reverberated within Vietnam itself, escalating from anti-Chinese protests to riots targeting Chinese businesses and citizens in the country. The fact that protests in a heavily restrictive country were not quelled before they got underway may be interpreted as a deliberate signal from the Vietnamese authorities to Beijing.

Vietnam’s actions in the disputed territories, often guided by a “tit-for-tat” principle, are systematic and well-calculated, particularly in land reclamation efforts that involve artificially creating land masses in shallow sea areas. According to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), from November 2023 to June of this year, Vietnam reclaimed over 280 hectares of land across a total of ten features. Compared to the statistics for 2022 and 2023 (138 and 164 hectares, respectively), the current situation shows a marked intensification of Vietnam’s activity and effort to gain the best possible foothold in the territories central to the Sino-Vietnamese territorial disputes. China aside, Vietnam is the undisputed leader in land reclamation in region[3], having reclaimed about 971 hectares of land so far, which is about half of China’s total of 1,861 hectares. These trends, of course, would not have gone unnoticed in Beijing. A 2024 report by China’s Grandview Institution provides an overview of construction activities in the Spratly Archipelago carried out by Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. More than half of the report is dedicated exclusively to Vietnam, with Grandview analysing as many as 29 cases of “islands and reefs occupied by Vietnam”. The report notes: “As of 2019, the scale of Vietnam’s island construction was small, with the land area having increased by only about 0.5 square kilometres. However, in 2022, Vietnam initiated large-scale construction projects on these islands and reefs. [That year,] Vietnam’s land expansion projects added approximately 1.7 square kilometres of new land.”

The largest outposts in the Spratly Islands. Vietnam holds as many as five of them. Source: CSIS/AMTI

            Recently, there has been growing concern that the Sino-Vietnamese territorial dispute may escalate. One indication of this is the gradual revival of another historical hotspot: the Gulf of Tonkin. In early 2024, China announced a new redrawing of the baselines to establish the extent of the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone in the Gulf of Tonkin. Following the bilateral agreement on territorial boundaries reached in 2000, disagreements over the Gulf were until recently considered to have been definitively resolved and “extinguished”. The situation now seems to be changing: Beijing’s redrawing of the boundaries is an attempt to convert a significant portion of the area into Chinese inland waters, potentially impacting the free movement of both Vietnamese and foreign vessels. In response, the Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs urged Beijing to act in accordance with the previously concluded bilateral agreement regarding territorial baselines in the Gulf, emphasising that “coastal countries need to abide by the 1982 UNCLOS when drawing the territorial baseline”. Similar measured and calculated criticism in Vietnam’s official statements towards China is the norm, but in reality, we are likely to see increased Vietnamese activity, including a more active navy. Hoang Viet, a lecturer at Ho Chi Minh City’s University of Law, points out that “the gulf was already demarcated. China cannot claim more than what it agreed on in the deal”. Hoang emphasised that “it’s almost impossible” for Beijing to amend the agreement already ratified by both countries.

Stormy Seas Ahead: China’s Quest for Maritime Dominance is Backfiring?

            China’s conduct in the South China Sea has changed radically since Xi Jinping assumed office. Beijing’s earlier desire to flex its growing muscles has gradually evolved into kinetic clashes with the very real threat of a rapid escalation of the conflict. However, the disproportionate balance of power between China and the other participants in disputes, coupled with Beijing’s aggressiveness, is starting to backfire, prompting countries in the region to reconsider their longstanding balancing strategies and often overly deferential positions towards China, particularly in the context of the South China Sea. The growing sense of insecurity and threat from China is driving them to actively pursue closer relations with the West. Interestingly, Beijing’s actions have also spurred other countries to seek resolution of their historical and territorial disputes that had previously hindered bilateral relations and the ability to form a more unified and coordinated stance vis-à-vis China.

Perhaps the most serious red flag for Beijing is the recent trend of the region’s increasingly closer ties with the West. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a significant catalyst for this shift, it is Beijing’s steadily increasing aggressiveness in the South China Sea that presents the most immediate risk to them. Closer cooperation, the renewal of existing agreements and the conclusion of new ones, more frequent joint military exercises, and strengthened bilateral relations across various domains are all manifestations of this new trend that is directly influenced by Beijing’s threatening posture. The cooperation between the Philippines and the US is a case in point: despite the 2014 Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement, which granted the US access to five military bases in the Philippines, in 2023, the two countries additionally agreed on enhanced cooperation and access to four more bases. Additionally, in early 2023, the Philippine government announced its intention to review a proposal for a trilateral defence and security treaty involving the US and Japan. The strengthening of the coalition deplored by China seems to be noticeably progressing: in April 2024, at a summit of the three heads of state in Washington, the scope of cooperation across various areas was further expanded. As noted in the statement from the White House, “[a] new trilateral chapter between our three nations begins today.” The bolstering of ties among US allies, with China’s territorial claims as a unifying factor, is clearly reflected in the two-day joint US-Philippines-South Korea military drills held in the East China Sea on 12 April 2024. “China is basically pushing us closer to the United States and to the other countries that have already indicated their support, as far as Germany and as far as the Czech Republic,” said Renato Cruz De Castro, a professor of international studies at De La Salle University.

An aggressive China prompts other countries to start resolving territorial and other historical disputes. This shift, deeply unwelcomed in Beijing, is already yielding results in the East China Sea: despite deep-rooted historical disagreements, Japan and South Korea are demonstrating ever-closer cooperation across various domains. The situation in the South China Sea region is beginning to move in a similar direction. The prime example here is the rapprochement between Vietnam and the Philippines. In January of this year, the leaders of the Philippines and Vietnam agreed to enhance cooperation between their respective coastguards. And in June, Vietnam openly declared its willingness to engage in dialogue and coordinate with the Philippines in the South China Sea. In response, the Philippines announcedthat Manila was ready to pursue mutually acceptable solutions to resolve its differences with Hanoi in the South China Sea. Despite the ongoing tension among the region’s countries, it is plausible that Vietnam and the Philippines can set a precedent for cooperation in the South China Sea, potentially serving as a blueprint for other nations.

The territorial dispute between China and the Philippines, one of the most volatile hotspots in the region, has reached new heights without significant attempts at de-escalation. However, we should bear in mind the complexity of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the actions of other parties pursuing/safeguarding their interests. In my view, we need to start taking much more seriously the other often overlooked hotspot: the Sino-Vietnamese territorial dispute. The smokescreen of ideological kinship masks the fact that the two countries are more than ever actively competing to reclaim, fortify, and militarise new territories. Unlike the Philippines, which still forms its stance towards China in real time, Vietnam has strategised its actions in the South China Sea for decades with precision. Its actions reflect a rather steadfast posture and fearlessness in confronting China, even as Hanoi exhibits caution and a degree of humility at the official level. In the short term, the situation has the potential to escalate into a much riskier confrontation, mainly due to the volatile domestic politics in Vietnam. Vietnam is currently undergoing a period of political instability, a rather unusual occurrence in the country’s political life. In the midst of a pervasive anti-corruption/opposition-elimination campaign, apart from numerous dismissals from various political posts, the country has already witnessed the resignations of two presidents and the parliament speaker in the last 15 months. Amidst a public frenzy over massive corruption scandals and power struggles[4], the Communist Party of Vietnam is about to hold a landmark National Congress in 2026 to elect a new General Secretary of the Party to replace Nguyen Phu Trong, who is now in his third term. Why might this exacerbate the situation in the South China Sea? The power struggle between different factions may lead to more aggressive actions by Vietnam in the disputed territories to divert public attention away from domestic issues^[5] and stir up nationalist sentiment, all in the name of defending the country’s sovereignty in the South China Sea. And the need to rally the public around the flag is as great as ever: Vietnam’s economic problems, including rising unemployment, an unstable investment climate, extreme poverty, corruption^[6], and huge social inequality, are among the greatest challenges the country has ever faced, but for the time being, the Vietnamese Communist Party is preoccupied with other matters.