Institutions and organizations researching and monitoring the informational policies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are observing a dramatic increase and expansion in the regime’s efforts to shape and influence the global information space. This trend is followed by a careful and expanding effort to understand the tactics used by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which vary from propaganda and misinformation and the suppression of critical voices to the promotion of digital authoritarianism, utilizing aggressive means such as intimidation and diplomatic, pressure as well as gaining control over media and information technologies
Classic Cleavages in a New Light: Chinese Informational Influence in the Baltics
Institutions and organizations researching and monitoring the informational policies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are observing a dramatic increase and expansion in the regime’s efforts to shape and influence the global information space. This trend is followed by a careful and expanding understanding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) tactics, which vary from propaganda and misinformation and the suppression of critical voices to the promotion of digital authoritarianism, utilizing aggressive means such as intimidation and diplomatic, pressure as well as gaining control over media and information technologies.[1]
There is an increasing consensus that Beijing is not only using information to maximize its gains, but rather, along with other autocratic regimes, to instrumentalize a deeper penetration into the informational sphere as a way to undermine and revise the existing international rules-based order, while also diminishing the role of the US in the process.
There has also been a slight shift in the perception of the informational influence. With the heavy investment in different assets and sectors, this influence was often viewed by Beijing as secondary to the buildup of economic and political power. Propaganda and misinformation aimed at advancing China’s image as a rising global technological and economic superpower, as well as promoting a positive view of the CCP and its authoritarian regime. The influx of Chinese investments – for example, through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – is also helping to consolidate the regime. This involves not only using the same information as a means to control actual movements of people, monitoring content sharing, and harvesting private information under the pretense of managing the COVID-19 epidemic, but also buying off the silence of Western countries on the Chinese human rights record. However, in the past few years, and especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this has begun changing. There is an increasing consensus that Beijing is not only using information to maximize its gains, but rather, along with other autocratic regimes, to instrumentalize a deeper penetration into the informational sphere as a way to undermine and revise the existing international rules-based order, while also diminishing the role of the US in the process.
PRC officials repeated the Russian propaganda saying that NATO is an aggressor and is fueling the war. In turn, the Russian state media cited these PRC statements as proof of an international consensus in favor of Russia’s continued aggression against Ukraine.
Such an anti-democratic alliance is cemented not by ideals, but by mutually beneficial deals, which include reaffirming and amplifying each other’s narratives and messages in order to sow discontent and polarization in democratic states. For example, the PRC officials repeated the Russian propaganda saying that NATO is an aggressor and is fueling the war.[2] In turn, the Russian state media cited these PRC statements as proof of an international consensus in favor of Russia’s continued aggression against Ukraine. Their goal was to instill doubt about the direction of Western resolve, undermine trust in national governments and its direction, deepen the polarization among different political groups and directly challenge democratic governance, presenting autocracy as more efficient and beneficial form of government.[3]
This requires not only understanding the direct influence the PRC can exert over other countries’ informational space, exposing their tactics, but along with it, assessing the attitudes and views that may be exploited by China. For example, they can exploit the existing relationship of citizens to the government, such as trust in its policies and the capacity to execute them, the perception of their personal and their country’s security, and attitudes towards transatlantic relations and European cohesion.
According to a recent study by the International Republican Institute (Summer 2022) that compared the Chinese influence in the three Baltic states, it is obvious that the number of those with a critical view of China has increased: 91% of the respondents in Estonia and 79% in Latvia and Lithuania, respectively, cited China’s partnership with and support of Russia as a key reason for this shift.
According to a recent study by the International Republican Institute (Summer 2022) that compared the Chinese influence in the three Baltic states, it is obvious that the number of those with a critical view of China has increased: 91% of the respondents in Estonia and 79% in Latvia and Lithuania, respectively, cited China’s partnership with and support of Russia as a key reason for this shift. While a minority of people indicated that their attitude towards China had improved, they cited the economic development model of China as the reason for this.[4] That indicates several things. First, the worsening opinion of China is directly linked to its increased effort to establish itself as a political superpower by aligning itself to other authoritarian powers. On the other hand, the current economic anxiety, as well as a pragmatic understanding of China’s economic influence is a key vulnerability.
This is the backdrop to the study, conducted by the Eastern Europe Studies Centre (EESC) in partnership with the Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA) and the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) (Estonia), aimed at assessing the receptiveness and resilience of the three Baltic states to the Chinese influence in the information domain.
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Footnotes
[1] Engagement Center, “How the People’s Republic of China Seeks to Reshape the Global Information Environment”, 2023, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/HOW-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-SEEKS-TO-RESHAPE-THE-GLOBAL-INFORMATION-ENVIRONMENT_508.pdf; Freedom House, “Beijing’s Global Megaphone. A Special Report”, 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/beijings-global-megaphone.
[2] The Global Engagement Centre report illustrates how certain messages about the war appear in the Russian media, then are quoted by Chinese outlets, and then reinforced as Chinese positions in Russia again; see Global Engagement Center, “How the People’s Republic of China Seeks to Reshape the Global Information Environment”, 2023, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/HOW-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-SEEKS-TO-RESHAPE-THE-GLOBAL-INFORMATION-ENVIRONMENT_508.pdf.
[3] Simon Denyer, “Move Over, America: China Now Presents Itself as the Model ‘Blazing a New Trail’ for the World,” Washington Post, October 19, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/10/19/move-over-america-china-now-presents-itself-as-the-model-blazing-a-new-trail-for-the-world/.
[4] International Republican Institute, “Survey of Public Perceptions of China in 13 European Countries.”, 2022, https://www.iri.org/resources/public-perceptions-of-china-in-13-european-countries-august-2022/.
Senior Project Manager with experience in proposal writing, project management and working in the NGO sector. At EESC is responsible for programming, project development, monitoring and oversight.Until joining the RESC team in 2021, she worked at Lithuanian Open Fund, managing European Programme and other international organizations.She is interested in political theory and philosophy, issues of memory and identity in 20th century history, intellectual history and regime change. Co-author of the publications LRT.lt, Naujasis Židinys-AIDAI, Bernardinai.lt, New Eastern Europe, Visegrad Insight, Democracy Seminar, author of academic studies, speaks English and Russian. She is working on her dissertation on Hannah Arendt’s notion of the political at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science.
Associate Professor of Asian Studies and International Politics at Vilnius University (Lithuania); former Senior Visiting Scholar at China’s Fudan (Shanghai, 2011) and Zhejiang (Hangzhou, 2013) Universities, as well as at Columbia University (New York, USA, 2017, Fulbright Scholar Program); author of two books on contemporary Sino-Russian-Indian relations (2016) and on the History of Pre-modern Non-European Civilizations (2018).
Dr. Bērziņa-Čerenkova is the Head of the China Studies Centre at Riga Stradins University; Head of Asia program at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs and a member of the European Think tank Network on China.
She has studied at Beijing Language University, Beijing Normal University et.al. After having defended her doctoral dissertation on traditional Chinese discourse in Hu Jintao’s report to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, she has held a Senior visiting research scholar position at Fudan University School of Philosophy, Shanghai, China (2014/15) and a Fulbright visiting scholar position at the Center for East Asia Studies, Stanford University, USA (2019/20). Dr. Bērziņa-Čerenkova publishes on PRC political discourse, contemporary Chinese ideology, EU-China relations, as well as Belt and Road and other transcontinental interconnectivity initiatives.
Tomas is the Head of studies at the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS); a visiting professor at the European Interdisciplinary Studies Department/College of Europe (Natolin campus); Associate Fellow at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs.
He holds a BA in political science from the University of Vilnius, an MA in war studies from King’s College London and an MBA degree from the University of Liverpool. Previously worked as deputy director of the Baltic Defence College’s Institute of Defence Studies in 2001-2004, and later as dean of the college in 2005-2008. In the latter capacity, he was also the editor of the journal ‘Baltic Security and Defence Review’. In 1998-2001 and in 2005, Tomas worked at the Defence Policy and Planning Department of the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence.
Dmitri Teperik joined the ICDS on 1 August 2015 as a research fellow on strategic communication and then served as the chief executive (2016-23). He has over 10 years of experience in contributing as a director or a leading subject-matter-expert to various international research projects, interdisciplinary studies, development cooperation programmes, professional training and outreach activities on comprehensive resilience and complex measures against hostile influence and disinformation. Among the key topics, he has studied socio-psychological factors shaping societal resilience and cohesion, cognitive security, cross-sectoral crisis management, media consumption, situational awareness in information environment, effects of social media, as well as interdependencies between strategic communication and group behaviour patterns. His main focus areas include Ukraine, the Baltic states, and the post Communist countries of Eastern Europe.
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