Countering Russian hybrid interference with EU sanctions

It took ten years after the illegal annexation of Crimea and the establishment of Russian-controlled separatist groups in the Donbas and Luhansk regions for the EU to recognise that Russian manipulation of European public opinion not only exists but must also be countered. From simply unravelling Russian disinformation narratives, carried out by the long-standing, underfunded and ignored East StratCom Task Force (established in 2015), the EU launched its harsh artillery of sanctions mechanisms against Russian sources of disinformation. The path was uneven, demonstrating that the EU was gradually reviewing its policy towards securing the European media and public space against malign interference of Russian origin, mainly in the context of the Russian war against Ukraine.

Banning Russian media active in Europe

Brussels’ first steps to counter elements of Russian foreign malign information interference (FIMI) came as part of the “third package” of sanctions against Russia (February-March 2022), a couple of days after Russia began its open military aggression against Ukraine. This package included a ban on the broadcast of twomedia outlets, Russia Today and Sputnik, which promoted a distorted version of events from a Russian revanchist perspective (March 2022).

After almost three months of war, the EU adopted the “sixth sanctions package” (June 2022) which, among other measures, aimed at the suspension of the retransmission rights of three television channels controlled by the Russian state: Rossiya RTR/ RTR Planeta, Rossiya 24/Rusia 24 and TV Center International. They were considered the main sources of the Russian disinformation campaign during the war (in/against Ukraine). The EU admitted that these media outlets were spreading the Kremlin’s narratives in Ukraine and EU member states. The ban on access to these channels had a comprehensive approach, covering access by cable, satellite, internet and smartphone applications. Advertising these points of sale and their products on EU territory is also prohibited.

Six other Russian media outlets were banned under the ninth and tenth sanctions packages adopted successively in December 2022 and February 2023, respectively. As part of the tenth package, the EU intensified its previous approach of blacklisting Russian public figures who acted as propagandists for the war against Ukraine on banned Russian television (February 2023). The EU sanctioned five more Russian television channels in June 2023 under the eleventh sanctions package.

The EU sanctions regime aimed at stopping Russian aggression against Ukraine continued to be accompanied by anti-disinformation sanctions in 2024 as well. In a separate decision from May 2024, not attributed to any specific sanctions package, Brussels banned four new media outlets: Voice of Europe, RIA Novosti, Izvestia and Rossiyskaya Gazeta.

In the first 13 sanctions packages, the EU banned up to 20 Russian media outlets, including television channels and online media, and their managers, as well as so-called “propagandists”, for spreading false information and/or acting as propagandist platforms for the Kremlin’s pro-war narratives (see the table below).

EU sanctions on Russian media for disinformation related to the Russian aggression against Ukraine

Source: Author’s compilation based on https://finance.ec.europa.eu/

EU sanctions: from targeting Russian media to going after FIMI networks

Between 2022 and 2024, EU measures to detect and contain Russian disinformation against its attempt to distort the perception of the European public were mostly reactive. The sanctions used have served to control the damage and have not had a preventive role. Only after the Czech authorities revealed the functioning of a Russian network in which the media outlet “Voice of Europe” and far-right German politicians (Petr Bystron) participated (April 2024). This network carried out FIMI information operations on behalf of Russia with the help of Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk (Vladimir Putin is the godfather of Medvedchuk’s daughter from his third wife). Medvedchuk, investigated in 2022 on charges of state treason in favour of Russia, was sent to Russia in exchange for Ukrainian military prisoners. In 2024 he opened the branch of the Russian NGO “Another Ukraine” in Serbia (January 2024), illustrating that Russia is using Medvedchuk as a proxy to interfere both in the EU and its immediate neighbourhood. Following the “Voice of Europe” conspiracy, the EU designed novel and far-reaching restrictions that, for the first time in the history of EU sanctions, address the Russian FIMI more comprehensively.

Unlike previous sanctions that have been passed since February 2022, the EU has imposed strict rules against financial transactions originating from Russia to political and civic entities in Europe. These restrictions belong to the latest EU sanctions package (the fourteenth wave of sanctions), which prohibits any financing in the form of “donations, economic benefits or other financing” from the Russian state and its (still vaguely defined) representatives of political parties, civil society organisations, NGOs and media, all registered in the EU member states. These types of sanctions go beyond targeting specific Russian media outlets for their disinformation, paving the way to combat the more complex FIMI mechanism. Therefore, both the “spreader” represented by the media and the “emitter” of Russian narratives, which can take the form of a politician or an NGO from EU member states, are equally in the spotlight. Essentially, Brussels has prohibited any transfer between Russia and the eventual FIMI ecosystems, built on EU soil, to prevent, or at least complicate, the operations of malign information campaigns led by Russia.

During the previous restrictive measures, banking transactions between Russia and the EU were paralysed. The new sanctions limit Russia’s ability to pay its representatives in Europe for FIMI services. They also serve as a warning sign for EU politicians, civic activists and journalists to stay away from Russian money and Russian hybrid activities in public and media spaces. It is still up to national capitals to establish internal mechanisms to identify and dismantle Russian FIMI networks before they cause harm. To this, stricter authorisation and due diligence rules for staff of EU institutions should also be added. Recent investigations in the European Parliament indicate that Russia can also recruit EU citizens, whether they are parliamentarians (the Latvian case of Tatjana Ždanoka) or European employees (the Dutch case of Guillaume Pradoura).

What’s next?

It is right to recognise that the EU took far-reaching steps to unmask Russian disinformation channels that operated unhindered, before and after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The EU’s understanding of Russian hybrid warfare operations against the EU unity, particularly in the demonstration of support for Ukraine, has only matured due to the geopolitical crisis caused by Russian aggression against Ukraine.

However, the EU needs to develop more specific tools to enhance member states’ responsibilities in combating and preventing Russian FIMIs. Consideration should be given to submitting annual reports on the vulnerabilities of EU member states and the 10 EU candidate states to the Russian FIMI. Cooperation with NATO could serve as additional effort in this regard.

The fight against FIMI must be institutionalised and adequately funded. In this sense, the EU can create new “anti-hybrid warfare task forces” that would go beyond what the East StratCom Task Force does to debunk Russian disinformation through EU Disinfo and build EU strategic communication in the eastern neighbourhood. Finally, the investigation into FIMI’s operations on EU soil must include China’s individual actions, as well as China’s possible coordination with Russia.