Critical elections in Georgia and Moldova: Is there a risk of a “color revolution”?

The West and Russia: Contrasting narratives about the protest potential in Georgia and Moldova

The strategic significance of the elections in the two EU Eastern Partnership candidate states, Georgia and Moldova, is evident in the discourse and behavior directed toward these nations by both the West and Russia. Each side views these elections as pivotal in shaping the future political trajectory and geopolitical alignment of Georgia and Moldova, with implications for regional stability and influence.

From the Western perspective, the Georgian government’s policies concerning civil society and human rights are increasingly seen as moving the country away from democratic standards. The EU has effectively frozen Georgia’s candidate status[1] until the controversial “agents of foreign influence” law, which targets Western-financed NGOs, is repealed. Similarly, Brussels has objected[2] to legislation limiting the rights of the LGBTQ community specifically in regard to public demonstrations, cultural events, and the display of symbols.[3] Georgian opposition frequently argues that the Georgian Dream party’s direction signals growing Russian influence, particularly due to Georgia’s refusal to align with various Western sanctions against Russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (direct flights,[4] operation of certain payment systems,[5] etc.).

Conversely, the EU, alongside the US, has provided unwavering political and legal support to Moldova. This includes implementing sanctions against individuals and entities linked to Russia, focusing on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI). Both the Georgian opposition and Moldovan government highlight Russia’s efforts to interfere in their countries’ internal affairs, aiming to derail their European integration. In Moldova, the government and Western partners have specifically warned of pro-Russian forces potentially plotting to overthrow the government after the upcoming presidential elections, claiming potential electoral fraud as a pretext.[6]

On the other hand, Russian narratives appear in the discourse of government voices, emulating autocratic behavior, and the information campaigns of pro-Russian non-state actors. Thus, the Georgian ruling elite, with its illiberal stance similar to that of Hungary, frequently echoes Russian narratives, suggesting that the West supports a potential “color revolution” led by the opposition. This has been used to justify a harsher approach to the mass protests initiated by civil society and opposition groups against the controversial “agents of foreign influence” law between April and July. The ruling party, Georgian Dream, along with the oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili,[7] has employed hostile rhetoric to delegitimize the EU’s and the West’s support for opposition forces. A key aim of the inflammatory discourse from Georgia’s top politicians[8] against politicians representing the EU is to dissuade the Georgian public from participating in protests. The government hopes to suppress pro-protest sentiment and prevent large-scale demonstrations from materializing.

In the case of Moldova, pro-Russian forces have explicitly warned against potential anti-government protests, for which the trigger is the exclusion of opposition candidates from elections.[9] Another motivation for the opposition to start protests is the allegation of election rigging that would benefit President Maia Sandu’s reelection bid. This has unveiled a certain level of readiness in Moldova’s opposition to mobilize under the pretext of election fraud and has raised concerns within the ruling party about the risk of mass protests. In response to these developments, Western partners have been persuaded to impose sanctions on fugitive businessman Ilan Shor and his associates. These individuals and entities, operating from Moscow with the support of Russian institutions and officials, have deepened fears about malign Russian influence on Moldova’s internal politics, including through protests.[10]

Georgia: Government speculates that a “revolution” was attempted, but it is unlikely

In the lead-up to the legislative elections on October 26, the political power holders in Georgia, both formal and informal, including Bidzina Ivanishvili, have hinted that the “radical” opposition and “rich” NGOs are capable of inciting destabilization, including attempts at coups. These types of narratives are not new for the current Georgian government. In April 2023, former Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili alleged that the “destructive opposition,” along with certain members of the European Parliament, were involved in plans to “overthrow” the government by force and open a “second front” against Russia. Such narratives have bolstered the Georgian Dream party’s critique of the opposition, especially at a time when Georgia is under EU pressure to implement 12 key reforms to qualify for candidate status.[11]

The prospect of a democratic transfer of power is a central concern in Georgia as the opposition builds platforms to appeal to dissatisfied voters. To discourage mobilization efforts among opposition forces, the ruling party, Georgian Dream, portrays coalition attempts between opposition groups such as Lelo and For Georgia as insincere.[12] Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze has accused both the opposition and NGOs of attempting to “discredit elections.”[13] In recent months, Kobakhidze has claimed that the opposition intends to manipulate the national currency and exploit the visits of European politicians for political purposes to orchestrate a “revolution.”[14] Amid protests against the controversial “agents of foreign influence” law, Kobakhidze compared potential revolutionary scenarios in Georgia to the 2014 “Maidan Revolution” in Ukraine.[15] He suggested that the post-Maidan governments in Ukraine were externally influenced; though he avoided explicitly mentioning either the EU or the US. This framing seeks to equate anti-government protests with a “color revolution” driven by external interference, subtly attributed to Western actors. Such rhetoric echoes the anti-Ukrainian narratives pushed by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[16]

About a month ahead of the elections, the Georgian government dismisses the likelihood of any “revolutionary” scenario, claiming the opposition lacks sufficient resources.[17] Meanwhile, the oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, the first candidate on the Georgian Dream electoral list, urges the population to prevent the opposition from “returning to power.”[18] However, the integrity of the electoral process is crucial for maintaining Georgia’s dialogue with the EU. If the elections are deemed unfair, the EU may consider suspending the visa-free regime with Georgia. Pawel Herczynski, head of the EU Delegation, has warned that Georgia could face similar sanctions to those imposed on Belarus following the 2020 presidential elections that were deemed “not free and fair.”[19] Despite the government’s confidence in its majority public support,[20] it also emphasizes that law enforcement will counter the “radicalization of elections.”[21] The opposition, however, is banking on recent polls showing a surge in their favor, with four opposition parties and coalitions garnering approximately 60% of voting preferences.[22] Furthermore, the EU’s readiness to sanction Georgia’s ruling elites could act as a deterrent against any attempts to falsify the elections, fostering a more competitive electoral process that can lead to a democratic transition of power.[23]

Moldova: Pro-Russian opposition suspected of planning destabilization through violent protests

The Moldovan government has persistently accused certain factions of the opposition of intending to organize mass protests with the goal of destabilizing or even overthrowing the government. These suspicions are particularly high in the context of the upcoming presidential elections, which are set to coincide with the EU integration constitutional referendum. In response to these concerns, Moldovan authorities sought the support of the US and the EU, who stepped in with sanctions to counter potential destabilization efforts by pro-Russian political actors linked to Ilan Shor. Initially adopted in 2022 and 2023, the US[24] and EU[25] sanctions targeted Shor’s group, which has openly collaborated with Russian decision-makers. The group has allegedly sought to exploit Moldova’s persistent socio-economic problems, fueling protest sentiment through bribery and orchestrated demonstrations.

The actions of Ilan Shor are widely regarded as a threat to Moldova’s national security, aligning with Russia’s geopolitical objectives to influence Moldovan electoral and political processes. Sentenced in absentia in 2023 to 15 years in prison for his involvement in the 2010–2014 “banking fraud,” Shor continues to be active in Moldovan politics from Moscow, where he positions himself as an “opposition political leader” in exile. His recently obtained Russian citizenship and the backing of Russian state-controlled media indicate close ties to decision-makers in the Kremlin. His party, the Shor Party, was declared “unconstitutional” in June 2023 and removed from the official list of political parties in January 2024,[26] due to its illegal financing. Despite this, Shor managed to form a new political bloc, the Victory bloc, which he coordinates from Moscow.

Shor’s focus, and implicitly that of Russia, in the upcoming presidential elections and the referendum, is twofold:

First, the goal is to mobilize votes against the incumbent Maia Sandu, by directing support toward her rival in a potential second round, scheduled within two weeks of the first round between the two candidates with the most votes. One candidate registered for the presidential race is Vasile Tarlev, leader of the Future of Moldova Party, who has been seen alongside Shor in Moscow,[27] suggesting he may be the preferred candidate of Shor’s group. Other candidates linked to Shor, such as Vasile Bolea,[28] have faced challenges, for example, when Bolea was deemed ineligible due to his affiliation with the Renaissance Party while attempting to run as an independent.

The second objective for Shor and his associates in Moscow is to discredit the outcome of the constitutional referendum concerning Moldova’s European orientation to benefit the pro-Russian sympathies in the country. Among the political vehicles of the Victory bloc, the Renaissance Party has been registered by the Moldovan Central Electoral Commission for the referendum. It joins the Communist Party as a key advocate for a “no” vote in the plebiscite. Additionally, another Shor-affiliated party within the Victory bloc, the Chance Party, was recently deregistered following a court ruling that suspended its activities for three months due to illegal financing.[29]

Members of the Victory bloc continue to protest but on a smaller scale[30] and primarily involving youths from outside the capital, Chisinau. The most recent protest was sparked by the Central Electoral Commission’s decision not to register the group collecting signatures for Vasile Bolea’s presidential candidacy.[31] The risk of mass protests remains if Shor’s group manages to co-opt other frequent protests. One example is the farmers’ protests, driven by dissatisfaction with the lack of state aid to support a sector hit by natural disasters and the burden of debt to banks.

To prevent these protests from escalating and attracting other discontented groups, the Presidential Office and the government have expressed a willingness to meet with the farmers. The upcoming presidential elections and the EU-related referendum, along with the potential risk of Shor’s attempts to exploit the legitimate farmers’ protest, have prompted Moldovan authorities to request solidarity funds from the EU and its member states.[32]

A key factor aiding the Moldovan government in preventing interference from Shor and Russia in the two electoral exercises scheduled for October 20 is the imposition of Western sanctions. In April 2024,[33] the EU renewed sanctions against 11 individuals and one entity linked to efforts to destabilize Moldova. Additionally, on September 13,[34] the US extended sanctions to three Russian companies and two individuals supporting Shor’s attempts to manipulate the electoral process in Moldova. Mass protests organized by Shor remain likely between the two rounds of elections and after the runoff. If Maia Sandu does not secure a landslide, unequivocal victory, protests may arise from speculations of fraudulent elections. The aim of these protests would be to undermine the legitimacy of the government’s success, should Sandu win, and to influence the political landscape ahead of the 2025 legislative elections.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the narrative of a “color revolution,” similar to that promoted by Russia, is evident in the public discourse of Georgia’s ruling party. While the Georgian government considers the likelihood of such a revolution low, it still suggests that the opposition might attempt to oust Georgian Dream. In contrast, the opposition is focused on ensuring fair electoral competition, hoping that the EU’s political conditionality will help secure free elections.

Meanwhile, the Moldovan government suspects the pro-Russian opposition of planning to use illegal financing and Russian media support to stage protests. The scenario that concerns Moldova’s current pro-EU government is that such protests could have electoral consequences, potentially bringing to power political forces that prioritize national sovereignty (“sovereignists”) or a pro-Russian stance, rather than the existing unconditional alignment with the West.