Two years into the Russian full-scale war against Ukraine and 10 years after the occupation of Crimea and aggression in Donbas, it is important to keep following the opinions of Ukrainian experts. This paper provides an overview of gathered written, spoken, or just empirically observable opinions among Ukrainian professionals, of how they perceive the current vector of the war, international and domestic Ukrainian politics. Three key aspects of expert discourse on the progress of the war that we can examine are battlefield developments, impact on European security structure and the development of partnerships and cooperation.
The “oil war” has the potential to markedly achieve in the short term what economic sanctions can only accomplish in the long-term perspective – drain the main source of Russia’s war financing, which precisely is Russian oil.
One of the key battlefield-related topics in Ukrainian expert circles now is the growth of domestic military capabilities, new technologies and creative use of existing ones. Ukrainian experts note that domestic drone technologies stand as an example for the global defence industry and the future of combat. Some of the most important recent advancements are the increasingly effective attacks on the Russian oil refineries, and the strikes on Russian navy in the Black sea. The “oil war” has the potential to markedly achieve in the short term what economic sanctions can only accomplish in the long-term perspective – drain the main source of Russia’s war financing, which precisely is Russian oil. Sinking Russian ships in the Black Sea contributes to exhausting the Russian capacity for furthering their offensive operations and limiting the area of operations of the Russian Black Sea fleet.
The discussion on the scope and implications of Russian aggression is frequent among Ukrainian experts. They often emphasise that Russian imperialism stretches beyond the Ukrainian borders to alert the politicians and citizens of European states of the real danger that they could face as a result of hesitant reactions to Russian provocations. Two main arguments support this thesis. First, the alarming narratives of not only Putin, but other Russian officials, which regard the “will of Russia to return Europe under the influence of the Big Eurasia”, supported by false historical assumptions. Second, specific actions, like the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to the territory of Belarus, or the attacks on Ukraine that near the soil of NATO states and even violate their borders at times, like the recent incidents on Polish and Romanian territories.
Even if Russian kinetic actions against Europe are difficult to imagine in the near future, Ukrainian policy analyst Julia Kazdobina notes that it took Russia 8 years of strengthening their military presence in Crimea to begin a large attack on Ukraine in 2022. Ukrainian experts call Europeans and the rest of the world to be extremely cautious and prepared for any scenario, short-term and long-term.
There are also growing discussions regarding the state of the international political situation, material and political support. Given the expected turbulence in US politics in 2024, Ukrainian experts suggest accepting the need to strategize with less reliance on the political processes overseas. Delays in security assistance is an uncomfortable conversation that inevitably appears in the discourse by Ukrainian experts, they are worried about reduced initiative potential in military operations because of these delays. The experts recognise the importance of persistent declarations of support from Western leaders, and welcomed the Resolution of the European Parliament on the need for unwavering EU support to Ukraine, as well as the NATO-Ukraine Council established after last year’s Vilnius Summit. Yet there is a clear expectation for those statements to translate into even more effective financial and technical support.
Experts note that such arguments also apply to the Security Agreements signed with the UK, Germany, France, and other states, which, albeit important, are viewed warily among the Ukrainian experts due to the fear of repeating the history of the Budapest Memorandum.
Experts note that such arguments also apply to the Security Agreements signed with the UK, Germany, France, and other states, which, albeit important, are viewed warily among the Ukrainian experts due to the fear of repeating the history of the Budapest Memorandum – accepting declarative security guarantees, which do not promise sufficient and robust help in battling Russian aggression. The need for receiving very concrete, ratifiable and comprehensive guarantees (predominantly from nuclear states) is an issue frequently discussed in the Ukrainian expert circles, especially in the face of delayed American aid, which was agreed upon after months of debate. On this topic, analysts also carefully consider the implications of recent statements by the French President Macron about “not ruling out Western troop presence in Ukraine”. Ukrainian journalist and analyst Bohdan Butkevych notes that “it’s good that Paris started to raise the stakes, because this signifies the beginning of a new global geopolitical game”, in which Ukraine must find an appropriate place, taking into account that certain “stress points” (like Ukraine’s control over the Black Sea) matter to certain actors, and that this can be used to Ukraine’s strategic advantage.
Further on strategic planning, Ukrainian experts evaluate the difficulties that could arise during Ukraine’s further integration into the EU. Apart from the peculiarities of trade relations, especially between Ukraine and Poland, another important factor among expert opinions is the conceptualisation of Ukraine’s victory, and the understanding of how whichever situation persists in the Ukrainian East and South fits into the EU’s agenda. Analysts and politicians generally refrain from making predictions about the future of Ukraine’s reintegration of its temporarily occupied territories. But they do start adding more nuance to the development of potential scenarios Ukraine might face, questioning what will be the EU policy towards Ukraine in case the ultimate goal of reaching the borders of 1991 does not come true at the time of the desired accession to the European Union.
There is a noticeable and persisting consensus on the need to adhere to the given requirements for the EU integration, including those upheld by monetary incentives (like provided by the “Ukraine Facility” instrument). Both Ukrainian experts and civil society are closely monitoring decision-making processes in the Verkhovna Rada and demand precise adherence to most recommendations. An ongoing case of reforming the Bureau of Economic Security is a testament to that. Business associations cooperated and addressed the President of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Parliament, and the Cabinet of Ministers with a structured proposal on how to implement this and a series of other reforms to meet the requirements from the international partners, as well as support Ukrainian businesses.
It is up to Ukraine’s own efforts to present the case for these partnerships as ones in the interest of any potential ally country.
Another frequent topic of discussion among professionals from Ukraine is the importance of establishing well thought-out relations with different regions of the world, beyond Europe. It is up to Ukraine’s own efforts to present the case for these partnerships as ones in the interest of any potential ally country. Numerous examples can be found in the statements of experts: the electorate of African-American descent in the US can understand the Ukrainian context and the need to support Ukraine even from afar through appeals to colonial heritage and past of slavery. Communication with the countries of the Global South has the potential to become more fruitful if Ukraine effectively proves how Russia weaponizes food trade, and how Ukraine, in turn, can be a much more reliable partner, operating with good will (this can be illustrated by the idea to transfer the funds that can be extracted from Russian frozen assets as part of the “Make Russia Pay” initiative to supplying some states in the Global South with Ukrainian grain for free). “This is not even a question of inter-state marketing, it is a question of integration into the world on our own terms,” stresses Ukrainian political scientist Yevhen Hlibovytsky.
The more values-based considerations generally reflect a few key things in terms of intra-societal processes: Ukrainian citizenry progresses towards being a more mature and cautious society, demanding as much clarity as it can get amidst the fog of war from the government and from the foreign allies. This demand is visible, for example, in relation to the series of changes in the government and military commandment, initiated by Ukrainian President Zelensky. Experts and media representatives often call for an honest conversation with the public, whose request for justice and straight-forwardness is spoken about by sociologist Volodymyr Paniotto, about the rationale behind these changes, about the real plan for the future with understanding of all difficulties. Expectations of fast conflict resolution that persisted throughout 2022 have to finally change to growing adaptation and recognition of the need for strategic planning to ensure the preservation of sovereignty, encouraged responsiveness from key partners, as well as clarification and promotion of Ukraine’s tactical interests on the global stage.
This article presented a condensed picture of topics and ideas most frequently seen in the Ukrainian expert discourse in the first quarter of 2024. To conclude, Ukrainians hope the world does indeed know, what is at stake for those in Ukraine, like President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen remarked, and will indeed strengthen its united effort to defend itself from the dangers the future might behold.