Indian and Pacific Ocean Programme

Two years have passed since the opening of the Taiwanese Representative Office in Vilnius and the boiling point of the Sino–Lithuanian conflict that followed. On the surface, Lithuania’s rather firm stance and resistance amidst an authoritarian country’s pressure and qualitatively novel economic statecraft can be treated as a success story, in which it managed to emerge rather unscathed while also helping others realize that China is willing to use all leverages at its disposal to punish.

On 13 January 2024, Taiwan will hold presidential and legislative elections. This time, the political spectacle is extremely dramatic, with the opinion polls showing that the race is going to be tight. With no candidate having a strong lead, the main political parties are entrenched in their own political ideologies and visions in order to consolidate their main support bases. The presidential elections are particularly under the spotlight because of the influence that the president has on the country’s foreign policy and, notably, on Cross-Strait relations.

During the meeting between US President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in San Francisco, Xi stated that China “has no plan to surpass or unseat the United States” and he also noted that “the world is big enough to accommodate both China and the United States”. Xi’s messages are in stark contrast to his previous proclamation that “the East is rising and the West is falling.” This signifies that on the diplomatic front, Beijing has recognized the need to de-escalate tensions with the US by easing its stance and projecting a less confrontational and more positive, conciliatory tone.

On September 28, the U.S. State Department’s Global Engagement Centre (GEC) released a special report on how China seeks to reshape the global information environment. In the report China was accused of employing “a variety of deceptive and coercive methods … to influence the international information environment.” As a response, the Chinese Foreign Ministry pushed back hard against the report, accusing the United States of being an “empire of lies” and adding that “it is the US that invented the weaponizing of the global information space.”

This analytical review focuses on several dimensions: the current state of the Chinese economy and its important indicators, property and banking sectors, and youth unemployment as a significant societal challenge.

Some would say that China’s moral compass already broke in February 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine and China did not condemn the war while maintaining its pro-Kremlin neutrality. But is neutrality the best Beijing can do now in the face of unequivocal evidence of inhumane barbarity by Palestinian terrorists against Israelis in violation of all humanitarian and international law?

The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) announced that it will suspend the publication of youth unemployment data while the government seeks to “improve” and “optimize” statistical work. This announcement elicited decision on Chinese social media, with some users on Weibo accusing the government of “burying its head in the sand”. Indeed, the announcement comes at a critical juncture when the unemployment rate for 16- to 24-year-olds in urban areas hit a record high of 21.3%. However, instead of addressing the drastically worsening youth unemployment, the government has chosen to stonewall the issue.

Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the China factor has always remained under the international spotlight. While China, driven by a very pragmatic interest, has been continuing to embrace and strengthen its strategic partnership with Russia, it has also been seeking to be seen as a neutral country to not damage its relations with the West, namely the EU and the US.

In China’s highly secretive political landscape, an abrupt disappearance of a high-ranking official is not uncommon, but it often is a sign of trouble especially since Xi started its anti-corruption drive. In many cases, those officials would later surface along with the announcement of a criminal investigation. But, at the same time, there are instances (with Xi himself included) where politicians re-appear without any explanation.

Even though Blinken’s two-day trip to China, the first in his position to visit Beijing since 2018, yielded no breakthroughs on their most sensitive issues, namely the reopening of military-to-military exchanges, the visit appeared to have gone rather well.

An essential factor in this regard is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It’s an ongoing war, and the Chinese are studying at the tactical level.

In his keynote speech, the Chinese president urged the region to strive for a “community with a shared future, mutual assistance, common development, universal security and everlasting friendship”.

On 5–7 April, French President Emmanuel Macron, accompanied by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, embarked on a visit to China.

Towards the end of 2022, Sino-US bilateral ties finally started to signal some cautious steps toward a warming trend. However, this optimism soon dissipated, as the so-called “Chinese spy balloon” incident resulted in yet another serious challenge to Sino-US relations.

Read our second China review for 2023 in which we look over China's economic and security circumstances, its efforts to continue promoting itself as a key player in the international system, and Chinese manoeuvres regarding the war in Ukraine.

Xi Jinping was re-elected as the general secretary of the CPC Central Committee (CC). This is already his third five-year term in office.

In November 2021, Lithuania’s government agreed to establish a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius; in August 2022, Nancy Pelosi, the US Speaker of the House, made a bold visit to Taiwan despite all the threatening rhetoric from the People’s Republic of China.

The report on human rights in Xinjiang, released at the last minute by U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet, was an unpleasant blow to China’s leadership, which had considered her last visit a success.

The Code Red scandal, which has sent shockwaves through Chinese society, has shown that rapid digitalisation and the government’s overwhelming influence in the technology sector can be used against people.

While the COVID outbreak in Shanghai and Beijing is considered contained, considerable tensions and uncertainty remain in society due to the fact that severe restrictions can be reapplied at any time.

10 years ago, on 26 April 2012, the first summit between China and 16 CEE (Central and Eastern European) countries took place in Warsaw, launching the “16 + 1” format for China’s cooperation with the region

The strict COVID management policy initiated by Xi Jinping in 2020 has become one of the world’s most impressive success stories: Not only has China successfully contained the outbreak in Wuhan, it has also managed to achieve positive annual economic growth.

The uncertainty of Beijing’s position over the Russia-Ukraine war and the effort to present itself as a neutral observer is becoming an increasing challenge.

China’s interaction with CEE region and the objectives of its model of cooperation it formulated were premised not only on economic diversification but also on increasing Beijing’s political (normative) influence.

The review of Lithuania–China relations initiated by the current Government has already meant a significant decoupling on both the political–diplomatic and the economic–technological levels.

The 2010s were especially tumultuous times for the world, with it facing new challenges to international order and stability.

Since 1994, Alexander Lukashenko’s authoritarian rule and his regime’s grip on power has strengthened continuously, at the great cost of diminishing Belarusian civil liberties.

As of the end of 2020, for obvious and rather gloomy reasons the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has actually increased its topical relevance in the world, as well as in Lithuania, in comparison with the previous year which itself already seems to be a distant memory.

As will be shown below, the year 2019 also was unprecedentedly eventful for Sino-Lithuanian relations, causing numerous political debates and public interest in the southernmost of the Baltic states.